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Abstract The logics of “bringing-it-about” have been part of a prominent
tradition for the formalization of individual and institutional agency. They
are the logics to talk about what states of affairs an acting entity brings about
while abstracting away from the means of action. Elgesem’s proposal analyzes
the agency of individual agents as the goal-directed manifestation of an in-
dividual ability. It has become an authoritative modern reference. The first
contribution of this paper is to extend Elgesem’s logic of individual agency
and ability to coalitions. We present a general theory and later propose sev-
eral possible specializations. As a second contribution, we offer algorithms to
reason with the logics of bringing-it-about and we analyze their computational
complexity.
Keywords logic · bringing-it-about · coalitions · agency · ability · complexity
1 Introduction
We aim to contribute to the literature that views an action as the mere result of
the activity of an agent.1 It is generally acknowledged that this tradition dates
back at least to St. Anselm who claimed that the phenomenon of an action is
better explained by what is brought about. This is to be distinguished from
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1 We develop the research agenda presented in the earlier extended abstract published
as [47].
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other traditions of logic of action talking explicitly about action terms: for
instance, Dynamic Logics ([21]) in computer science, or the study of action
sentences in philosophy using first-order theories ([14]).
In the Anselmian tradition, a sentence “Jones pays his rent” is interpreted
as “Jones does that his rent is paid”. A logic equipped with a modality “does-
that” is particularly adequate for representing and reasoning about ex post acto
properties. In particular, it enables the reasoning about the responsibility of
an acting entity for a presently achieved state of affairs. Logics typically excel
in abstraction and modularity. This is no different for logics of the modality
does-that. For instance, relations of influence between agents—coercive or not,
positive or negative—are simply captured by combined statements as “Mary
does-that Jones does-that his rent is paid” or “Mary does-that it is not the
case that Jones does-that the rent is paid”. (See e.g., [37].) The does-that
modality can also be usefully combined with diverse other notions pertaining
to agents and multiagent systems (MAS). In imperfect information settings, it
allows to reason about epistemically uniform strategies when combined with
a concept of knowledge: “Jones knows that he does-that the rent is paid”.
(See e.g., [23].) Combined with a concept of obligation the main application of
Anselmian’s actions probably resides in deontic logics and normative systems
in general. While obligations alone allow to express “it is obligatory that the
rent is paid”, it is now possible to designate the subject of the obligation: “it
is obligatory that Jones does-that the rent is paid”. (See e.g., [35].)
The modality does-that has taken many forms in the literature. Chel-
las ([12]), von Kutschera ([29]), and Belnap and Perloff ([3,4]) have studied
within elaborate models of branching-time the modality now well known as
“seeing-to-it-that” (often referred as STIT). Belnap et al. have compiled in [4]
and [24] many interpretations of the modality. Most of them support a game-
theoretic interpretation of action: in a given situation, a group sees to it that
something holds if this something would also hold no matter what the other
agents do.
Kanger ([26]), Po¨rn ([37,38]), Lindahl ([31]), Elgesem ([15]), and others,
on the other hand have studied the same sort of modality in a variety of
frameworks, always abstracting away from time and from any game-theoretical
interpretations. Nowadays, the term preferred to designate the modality is
“bringing-it-about”. The bringing-it-about modality, henceforth noted Ex, has
been quite popular in the MAS community (e.g., [25,39,40,11,35]) where it
has been used to model the actions and responsibilities of acting entities x:
the formula Exϕ traditionally reads “x brings it about that ϕ”. In the MAS
literature about bringing-it-about, x has been either an individual agent, a role
in an institution, or an institutional agent. An institution can involve several
agents, each playing a specific role in it. But institutions are not groups or
coalitions.
It was mentioned in [11] to have x represent a set of agents. But only
in much earlier work ([26,31]) was a group version of the bringing-it-about
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modality analyzed with some depth.2 We borrow particularly from [31] in an
early step of our analysis.
Elgesem’s proposal has come up to be an authoritative modern reference
to the logic of the modality of bringing-it-about.3 On top of a thorough and
penetrating analysis of agency, the proposal in [15] particularly distinguishes
itself from the rest of the literature by studying the agency of individual agents
as the goal-directed manifestation of an individual ability. This will be our
starting point in this paper.
1.1 Contributions
The first contribution of this paper is an extrapolation of a theory of coalitional
agency and ability from Elgesem’s logic. That is, we study the logic of the
operator Ex where x is a set of agents, along with an operator of coalitional
ability Cx.
The second contribution is to provide algorithms to reason within these
logics and study their complexity. Although we are using standard techniques
of modal logics, this is, we believe, the first computational analysis of the logics
of bringing-it-about.
1.2 Individual agency and ability
Elgesem’s logic was a fresh look at a long tradition of philosophical logic of
action, where the traditional modality of bringing-it-about noted Ex is studied
alongside related modalities of action. The logic still admits the core principles
that are generally assumed for agency (where N is the set of individual agents,
and x ∈ N):
– all substitution instances of classical tautologies
– ` ¬Ex>
– ` Exϕ ∧ Exψ → Ex(ϕ ∧ ψ)
– ` Exϕ→ ϕ
– if ` ϕ↔ ψ then ` Exϕ↔ Exψ
For any enumerable set of agents N , we can obtain a logic of coalitional agency
and ability that is represented by the set of theorems determined by the pre-
vious Hilbert system. Let us note this logic BIATN .
Following Sommerhoff ([46]), Elgesem argues that agency is the actual
bringing about of a goal towards which an activity is directed. An agent acts
2 Maybe an exception is [34]. There, the agency of a coalition is defined as adequate
combinations of individual agency of its members. The additional operators with coalitions
are then merely syntactic sugar, leaving the expressivity of the logic unchanged. The logic
also goes beyond the Anselmian tradition by allowing explicit action terms in the language.
3 The main reference is [15] which unfortunately is not published. The reference [16] is
essentially the Chapter 2 of [15].
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to achieve a goal. But an agent is not necessarily aware of his goals, at least not
in the sense that he is consciously committed to achieve them. Elgesem also
leans on Frankfurt ([17, Chap. 6]) according to whom, the pertinent aspect
of agency is the manifestation of the agent’s guidance (or control) towards
a goal; not necessarily the intentional action. Here, we understand intention
in agency as a motivated goal, possibly long pondered and rational. Elgesem
seeks a more general notion of goal that guides agency.
Elgesem observes that the manifestation of control is the exercise of a
power to bring about something. Therefore, the notion of potential control of
an agent for a goal should be integrated in a theory of agency. What is then
particularly interesting of Elgesem’s logic is that the modality of agency is
studied alongside a modality to talk about this potential control: a modality
of ability. Elgesem argues that we should not deny the possibility of abilities
that are exercised only once, giving the example of Bob Beamon, who jumped
8.90 m (long jump) in the 1968 Olympics. If Beamon jumped that far it is that
he was exercising control towards a goal. Even though this goal was probably
not intentionally to jump 8.90 m, we would not take back from Beamon that
on that day he brought about the fact that he jumped that far and that he
had the ability to do it.
Elgesem then suggests that there is a more basic notion of ability than
an intention-based one, and that this non-intentional notion of ability is a
necessary condition for agency.4 By bringing about something, an agent shows
that he is indeed able to so. In this paper we advance an interpretation of
evidence-based ability.
Elgesem’s philosophy involves a net of notions related to agency but one
may just focus on the two modalities Ex (agency) and Cx (ability) from which
the others are derived. This is what Governatori and Rotolo do in [19]. They
provide a criticism of Elgesem’s logic by a careful logical analysis of these two
operators. One of their main results is the completeness of the logic. Besides
the core principles of agency listed above one needs to add the following to
capture ability (x ∈ N):5
– the axiomatics of BIATN
– ` ¬Cx⊥
– ` ¬Cx>
– ` Exϕ→ Cxϕ
– if ` ϕ↔ ψ then ` Cxϕ↔ Cxψ
For any enumerable set of agents N , let us note ELGN the logic consisting of
the set of theorems determined by the previous Hilbert system.
4 Similar distinctions between different kinds of ability have later been made by Kapi-
tan ([27]) and Mele ([32]). Mele calls them simple ability to A and ability to A intentionally.
He writes: “an agent’s A-ing at a time is sufficient for his having the simple ability to A at
that time.”, and “being able to A intentionally entails having a simple ability to A and the
converse is false” ([32, p. 448]).
5 Notice that ¬Ex> becomes redundant.
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The logic of Cx is then rather weak.
6 The only certainty one can have
about the presence of an ability to bring about ϕ is in the presence of an actual
bringing about of ϕ. This is much different from the notion of ability that is
captured by Coalition Logic ([36,18]) or Alternating-time Temporal Logic ([2]).
In Coalition Logic, an ability exists right before the action that would be the
manifestation of the ability. G is able to bring about ϕ in Coalition Logic if
G can select an action in his current repertoire that if chosen, would ensure ϕ
at the next step, whatever the other agents do. Once the ability is realized, at
the moment of the actual agency, nothing ensures that the ability still exists.
This is also different from Kenny’s view on ability ([28]) which is one where
an agent has the ability to bring about ϕ if he could bring about ϕ whenever
he tries. Hence, Kenny suggests that ability requires repeatability.
The notion of ability captured by Elgesem is nevertheless very appealing
because it is one where the observation of an evidence induces the existence
of an ability. Imagine a repository of web services that are acting in some way
upon their environment and can be queried. Whenever a request is successfully
fulfilled, the ability of a service for a particular query can be logged and the
couple service/query can be offered as a suggestion for later use.
This evidence-based perspective of ability is strikingly weak in the individ-
ual case. We will present briefly some perspectives to refine further the notion
with the integration of some form of induction in Section 6. Nevertheless, the
main aim of this paper is to study a framework allowing coalitions of agents
to work together towards a same goal. We will see that extending the logic to
coalitions can offer more flexibility for the suggestion of potentially successful
acting entities, even for complex goals that have never been brought about.
1.3 Joint actions
We will identify a group with an arbitrary subset of agents. Joint actions are
a species of actions involving a group that acts towards a shared goal. Schmid
calls these actions plural, with main characteristics “many participants, one
goal” ([42]). Miller ([33]) says of a joint action that it involves two co-present
agents each of whom performs simultaneously with the other agent one basic
individual action, and in relation to a collective goal.
Despite resorting to the concept of a collective goal,7 Miller argues that
we-intentions ([49]) are not a necessary element of joint actions. When two
scholars start chatting at a conference break and somewhat start to take a
walk in the park, they respect their turn in the conversation, they synchronize
their pace, and take a direction in the park without having previously agreed
on it.8 Similar to the individual case (Beamon’s jump), this suggests that there
is a more basic notion of coalitional goal-directed agency than an intentional
one. Again in analogy with the individual case, that means that there is a
6 See [52] for a similar and even weaker account of ability.
7 Miller uses the terminology “collective end”.
8 This example is adapted from [5].
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basic notion of coalitional ability that is a necessary condition for coalitional
agency. In particular, at a given time and from the evidence of actual agency
of some coalitions for some goals, we will be able to infer the potential ability
of larger coalitions for more complex goals. To come back to our example
of web services, this suggests a procedure for web service composition. At
each time, we can use the logic to infer new complex coalitional abilities of
the system. In turn, this evidence-based perspective may actually provide a
practical alternative to the computationally costly orchestration procedures in
web service composition.
Since there is a basic notion of coalitional agency, like Elgesem for individ-
ual agency and ability, we can therefore focus on the principles of pure agency
and ability without having to struggle with the formation of we-intentions.
In addition to their possible unawareness of acting towards a particular goal,
agents will potentially be unaware of their membership in a group.
1.4 Outline
We will recognize the types of sufficient evidences to infer logically the exis-
tence of potential controls of groups, in a way that is consistent with Elgesem’s
philosophy. More generally, we will identify a variety of important principles
pertaining to coalitional agency and ability and assess their admissibility. This
is what we do in Section 2. Our presentation is first semantic, and in Section 3
we provide a complete syntactic characterization of the models of collective
agency and ability. In Section 4 we study the complexity of the logics and
provide algorithms for deciding the satisfiability of formulas.
In Section 5 we investigate possible strengthenings of our basic logic by
adding application specific principles of agency. In Section 6 we refine the
notion of ability by integrating some form of induction. Some considerations
and further clarifications are presented in Section 7. Finally, we conclude in
Section 8 and propose some perspectives.
2 Models of coalitional agency and ability
Effectivity functions are a mathematical tool used in social choice theory ([1])
to study the interaction of the powers of groups of agents. For an arbitrary
acting entity, an effectivity function is a function E : S −→ 22S indicating at
every state for what propositions (subsets of states) it is effective. There are
often some common conditions on these functions but like in [36], we designate
every function of this type as an effectivity function.
Effectivity functions have also been used in philosophical logic, as compo-
nents of the so-called neighborhood or minimal models ([13]). In particular,
Brown’s modality of ability in [9] was already interpreted with an effectivity
function.
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Governatori and Rotolo ([19]) propose an alternative semantics to Elge-
sem’s selection functions, where the models are equipped for every individual
agent with an effectivity function for what the agent is able to do, but also
with an effectivity function of what the agent is actually agentive for, that is,
what the agent brings about. Taking this as a starting point we are going to
extend these models with coalitions. One of the main objectives of this paper
is to propose and justify adequate constraints on the effectivity functions of
the models of coalitional agency and ability.
For now, the formula EGϕ reads “acting as the group G, G is bringing
about the goal ϕ”, while the formula CGϕ reads “acting as the group G, G is
able to bring about the goal ϕ.”
We assume a set of atomic facts P . A model of agency and ability is a tuple
(S,N,EE,EC, v) where S is a set of worlds, and N is a set of agents. For every
w ∈ S and G ⊆ N , the objects EEw(G) and ECw(G) are effectivity functions.
Hence, EEw(G) is a set of sets of worlds and so is ECw(G). If X ∈ EEw(G)
we say that at w, acting as a coalition, the group G is bringing about their
goal X. Analogously, if X ∈ ECw(G) we say that at w, acting as coalition, the
group G is able to bring about the goal X. Finally, v : S −→ 2P is a valuation
function, indicating for every world what atomic propositions are true in it.
To talk about these models we will use the language that is defined by the
following BNF (where p ∈ P and G ⊆ N):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | EGϕ | CGϕ
For every agent i ∈ N , we will use the notations Eiϕ def= E{i}ϕ and Ciϕ def=
C{i}ϕ. We remind that EGϕ stands for “coalition G brings it about that ϕ”
and CGϕ reads “coalition G is able to bring about that ϕ”.
In a standard set-theoretic interpretation a proposition ϕ, or fact of the
world is represented by the set of worlds where ϕ is true. The semantics of the
formula ϕ in a model M is defined as ||ϕ||M = {w | M,w |= ϕ}. To give the
meaning of our language it only remains to define what is |=:
M,w |= p iff p ∈ v(w)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff not M,w |= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= EGϕ iff ||ϕ||M ∈ EEw(G)
M,w |= CGϕ iff ||ϕ||M ∈ ECw(G)
Hence, at the state w of a model M , a group G brings about the goal ϕ when
at w the group G is bringing about the set of states in M where ϕ holds.
Analogously, at the state w, a group G is able to bring about the goal ϕ when
at w the group G is able to bring about the set of states in M where ϕ holds.
We adopt the usual definitions for the constants ⊥ and > and classical
connectives ∨, →, ↔. The language and the models presented above are the
most general that encompass all those we are going to study in this paper.
Eventually, we will restrict the set G to be a singleton, and obtain the lan-
guage and models for Elgesem’s logic. A further restriction will eliminate the
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component EC and the operator Cx, and obtain the language and models for
the standard logic of bringing-it-about.
For the moment, for every G our modalities EG and CG are the most
general form of classical non-normal modalities of necessity ([44,13]) and each
modality is independent of the others. The remainder of this section presents
the constraints that the models should satisfy in order to be useful for the
study of coalitional agency and ability. That is, by specializing the models, we
give to the language its most intuitive meaning.
2.1 Elementary constraints on the models
Rotolo and Governatori ([19]) have translated Elgesem’s philosophy of indi-
vidual agency and ability in the type of models that we have just introduced.
While we extend the purpose of the framework to coalitional agency, we ac-
knowledge that every constraint suggested by Elgesem for the individual case
lifts naturally to the coalitional case. Here, we adopt straightforwardly the
constraints for our models.
As usual in “bringing-it-about”, we assume that no agent or coalition brings
about the tautologies:
S 6∈ ECw(G). (1)
Also, we need to reflect that the elements of EEw(G) are the manifestation
of a successful agency of the group G at w:
if X ∈ EEw(G) then w ∈ X. (2)
Note that as a consequence, it is not possible for a group to bring about the
impossible: if X ∈ EEw(G) then X 6= ∅, for w at least must be in X. However,
as pointed out by Governatori and Rotolo, we also need to explicitly reject in
these minimal models that one can exercise control towards the impossible. It
yields the following constraint:
∅ 6∈ ECw(G). (3)
Two concomitant actions of the same agent or coalition are, in the termi-
nology used by Elgesem, aggregating:
if X1 ∈ EEw(G) and X2 ∈ EEw(G) then
(X1 ∩X2) ∈ EEw(G). (4)
It means that when a coalition acts towards two goals at the same time, they
also act towards the sum of the goals.
Finally, we need to model the relationship between agency and ability. By
bringing about a goal, an individual or a coalition is just giving evidence of
control over the goal. As such, actual agency implies ability.
EEw(G) ⊆ ECw(G). (5)
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By immediate evidence, a group is at least able to achieve what it is bringing
about. Observe that together with Constraint 1, we have that
S 6∈ EEw(G). (1E)
It is a more standard principle of bring-it-about logics of agency that must be
present in models that do talk about ability.
2.2 Constraints of coalitional agency and ability
So far, it is just like each coalition is nothing more than a fresh individual
acting entity. We need to acknowledge in our models that a term G indeed
represents a group of individuals.
In this section we argue that in a true coalitional setting, the specification of
the models so far is insufficient. Therefore, we will propose to further constrain
the models so as to capture an adequate notion of coalitional agency and ability
that we believe is consistent with Elgesem’s philosophy. Our methodology to
finding the coalitional version of Elgesem’s logic rather na¨ıvely consists in
thinking of a hypothetical principle and trying to show that it is not acceptable
in some scenario. If no significant counterexample is found, we must accept it
at that stage.
Our notions and our models are reminiscent of those studied in game and
social choice theory. Therefore, we will spend a significant part of this section
on explaining why we believe the usual constraints are not adequate in our
setting, but that some ideas can be successfully imported in an adapted form.
2.3 Empty coalition
We first look at the empty group that is the simplest group, though degenerate.
Our notion of agency is one that is goal-directed, and our notion of ability is
one of potential control towards a goal. It would not be right to give to the
empty group a status of true coalition with a goal and a potential control for
it. We adopt:
ECw(∅) = ∅. (6)
It naturally follows from Constraint 5 that EEw(∅) = ∅, too. That is, deprived
of potential control, the empty coalition is not an agentive entity at all. Also,
in the interest of clarity, observe that Constraint 6 is not in conflict with
Constraint 3. Indeed, if the empty coalition cannot exercise control towards
anything, then a fortiori it cannot exercise control towards the empty set.
On the other hand, agency and abilities of the grand coalition, that is the
coalition N containing all the agents, do not obey a special set of constraints.
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2.4 No coalition monotonicity
In [26], Kanger & Kanger explore the agency of parties and their parliamentary
rights. They use what they call the principle of joint parties, stating that
whenever a party P brings about a goal X, then every parliamentary group
constituted of at least P also brings about X. In our formal semantics:
if G1 ⊆ G2, and X ∈ EEw(G1) then X ∈ EEw(G2).
This is sometimes called coalition monotonicty in social choice theory ([36])
and it is a core principle in STIT theories ([24,8]). Kanger & Kanger do not
strongly commit to this principle, and seem to adopt it as a way to simplify the
exposition of their example. Instead, Lindahl ([31]) refutes the principle of joint
parties in his framework. His argument appeals to a notion of contribution of an
agent to the bringing about of a state of affairs. He argues that his conception
of agency is such that when a group of agents G brings about a goal X, then
every agent in G contributes to X. If the principle of joint parties were to
hold it would imply that whenever an agent brings about X, then “anybody
whosoever contributes to the bringing about” ([31, p. 225]) of X. Lindahl
considers it unacceptable. We also consider his argument a sufficient reason to
not adopt the principle as a general one.
2.5 Superadditivity
For an arbitrary effectivity function E consider the following property:
if G1 ∩G2 = ∅, X1 ∈ Ew(G1) and X2 ∈ Ew(G2) then
(X1 ∩X2) ∈ Ew(G1 ∪G2).
If at w,G1 is effective for X1 and also at w,G2 is effective for X2, the constraint
says that when G1 and G2 are disjoint groups one also have that at w, G1∪G2
is effective for X1 ∩X2.
It is a well-known constraint in social choice theory and is designated as
superadditivity.
Effectivity functions were designed to characterize the powers of coalitions.
Hence, the requirement that G1 ∩G2 = ∅ is fundamental. My power to be in
Toulouse tomorrow at noon together with my power to be in Liverpool at noon
do not imply that I have the power to be in both cities at noon.
2.5.1 No superadditivity of ability
Superadditivity is a foundational principle in Coalition Logic, a logic of powers
of coalitions. It seems that superadditivity could also be compatible with the
rather weak notion of ability that Elgesem tries to capture. He writes that
“there is clearly no problem in assuming that someone can have abilities that
are never exercised. A lion in the zoo, for example, is clearly able to catch
zebras; it just never has the opportunity to do it.” ([15, p. 36]). Hence, Elge-
sem’s notion of ability does not rely on an opportunity to exercise a control,
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and instead idealizes the possibility of an opportunity. Ideally then for the
coalitional setting, we could postulate that coalition formation can a priori
always be achieved. Two independent groups who are able to bring about two
goals are able to form one coalition (the union of the two existing coalitions)
with one goal (the intersection of the two existing goals) and bring it about.
In other words, abilities of smaller coalitions could be aggregated into abilities
of larger coalitions. We would have a sophisticated way to discover potential
control of coalitions over a goal.
But such a constraint would yield at least one very unfortunate conse-
quence. In social choice theory, we say that the powers of coalitions are regular
when for every group G, if G is effective for a proposition (a subset of worlds)
then the complement of G (the set G of all the agents that are not members
of G) is not a group effective for the negation of the proposition.
We argue that this is unacceptable for a notion of ability as a potential
control that might never be exercised if the opportunity is never offered. In-
deed, as Elgesem’s notion of ability is independent of opportunity, it should
be possible to concomitantly have an ability to bring about something, and an
ability to bring about its contrary. More so, this should be even true for two
different acting entities being deemed able to bring about two contradictory
state of affairs. Yet, superadditivity of ability would imply regularity of ability.
To see this, let X ∈ ECw(G1) and assume for reductio that X ∈ ECw(G2)
and G1 ∩G2 = ∅. By superadditivity we obtain that X ∩X ∈ ECw(G1 ∪G2),
that is ∅ ∈ ECw(G1 ∪G2), a contradiction with Constraint 3.
Hence, if a group G1 has a potential control over X it would be impossi-
ble for an independent group G2 to have potential control over X. To put it
bluntly, superadditivity of ability would mean that as soon that Ann is poten-
tially able to put the lights on, Bill could not be deemed able to put the lights
off. It is not a general principle that we want to have for a basis to model
multiagent systems. The type of ability we are concerned with is thus of much
different nature than the one captured by Coalition Logic.
2.5.2 No superadditivity of agency
If we do not think that superadditivity is an adequate assumption for our
notion of ability, we do not think that agency should obey a similar principle
either. What would be the consequences, for our idea of agency, of the con-
straint if G1 ∩G2 = ∅, X1 ∈ EEw(G1) and X2 ∈ EEw(G2) then (X1 ∩X2) ∈
EEw(G1 ∪ G2)? At w, G1 is bringing about the goal X1 while also at w, G2
is bringing about the goal X2. When G1 and G2 are disjoint groups one could
deduce in these models that at w, G1∪G2 is bringing about the goal X1∩X2.
It does not seem right. G1 and G2 are bringing about at w a goal of their
own. It would be presumptuous to say now that the two goals have just been
achieved, that their sum is also a goal; especially a goal of a coalition that
does not necessarily exist as such at the moment.
We assumed G1 and G2 to be non-overlapping groups and hence indepen-
dent. How about when they are not?
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When one group is strictly included in the other and we have X1 ∈
EEw(G1) and X2 ∈ EEw(G1 ∪ G2). In words, G1 are acting to obtain their
goal X1, and in addition the members of G1 are also acting together with
the bigger group G1 ∪ G2 to bring about X2, a goal of G1 ∪ G2. Should we
be able to deduce something more about the agentivity of some coalition?
It is easy to argue for a negative answer. If Page and Plant (G1) write to-
gether “Immigrant Song” (X1), and Page, Plant and Jones (G1 ∪ G2) write
together “Black Dog” (X2), Jones (G2) has nothing to do with the bringing
about of X1. It is not right, then, to say that Page, Plant and Jones have
written these two songs together. So we should not have in general to infer
that (X1 ∩X2) ∈ EEw(G1 ∪G2). From another standpoint, Page and Plant,
as G1, are not either bringing about their own goal to have these two songs
written as this would undermine the contribution of Jones in the writing of
“Black Dog”. Thus, we should not in general infer that (X1∩X2) ∈ EEw(G1).
Even though it might present an appropriate picture in some situations, it is
clearly not a general principle of agency.
On the other hand, when they are in fact the same group G, it is established
at the moment of agency that G are indeed a coalition and are achieving both
X1 and X2. Thus, following the tradition of bringing-it-about, we consider
that they are also achieving X1 ∩ X2 as the agglomerated goal of the same
group. It is a principle that we want, but this case falls under the case of
Constraint 4. We do not need to constrain the models further.
2.5.3 Superadditivity, kind of
However, our evidence-based perspective of ability suggests something some-
what in-between superadditivity of ability and superadditivity of agency.
if X1 ∈ EEw(G1) and X2 ∈ EEw(G2) then
(X1 ∩X2) ∈ ECw(G1 ∪G2). (7)
Notice that it involves both agency and ability. When two groups G1 and G2
successfully but independently bring about two goals X1 and X2, had they
acted as the coalition G1 ∪ G2 they would have collectively brought about
X1∩X2. Constraint 7 acknowledges that this is enough evidence for the ability
of the coalition G1 ∪G2 to bring about X1 ∩X2.
Quite remarkably, the condition G1 ∩ G2 = ∅ of superadditivity is not
necessary anymore. By their actual and concomitant agency, the groups G1
and G2 have shown that for every shared agent a ∈ G1 ∩ G2, the action of a
towards X1 and the action of a towards X2 are not in conflict.
It is readily seen that Constraint 7 is a generalization of Constraint 5. (It
suffices to take G1 = G2 = G and X1 = X2 = X.) As a further justification
that we are heading towards the right direction in extending Elgesem, it is
important to note that a similar principle of aggregation already exists in the
standard logics of bringing-it-about. By Constraint 4 we have indeed that two
goals X1 and X2 brought about at the same time by the same acting entity
aggregate in a goal X1∩X2 that is brought about. In turn, this bringing about
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implies the existence of an ability of the agent for X1 ∩X2 by Constraint 5.
We have merely generalized this inference to the case of two possibly different
acting entities.
It is a powerful formal device for our theory of evidence-based ability since
it allows to deduce potential abilities of coalitions of agents from smaller “suc-
cesses” in the society of agents. We can use the information of actual agency
and suggest that the group of agents G1 ∪G2 could potentially be solicited to
bring about the goal X1 ∩X2.
3 Axiomatizations
Let us now define a family of classes of models. We are going to character-
ize them syntactically. This will provide us two equivalent ways to look at
the logics: one semantic, one syntactic. This characterization is instrumental
for establishing the upper-bound on the logics’ computational complexity in
Section 4.
Definition 1 We say that a tuple (S,N,EE, v) is a model of individual agency
if it satisfies the Constraints 1E, 2 and 4.
We say that a tuple (S,N,EE,EC, v) is a model of individual agency and
ability if it satisfies the Constraints 1 through 5.
We say that a tuple (S,N,EE,EC, v) is a model of coalitional agency and
ability if it satisfies all the Constraints 1 through 7.
Naturally, the models of individual agency correspond to the core models of
the logic bringing-it-about. The models of individual agency and ability corre-
spond to the models of Elgesem’s logic. The following result has already been
established in [19]:
Theorem 1 For a set of agents N :
– the logic BIATN is sound and complete wrt. the class of models of individual
agency;
– the logic ELGN is sound and complete wrt. the class of models of individual
agency and ability.
We still have to characterize the models of coalitional agency and ability syn-
tactically.
For all groups G, G1, and G2 and formulas ϕ and ψ:
– [Ax0] ` ϕ , when ϕ is a tautology in propositional logic
– [Ax1] ` EGϕ ∧ EGψ → EG(ϕ ∧ ψ)
– [Ax2] ` EGϕ→ ϕ
– [Ax3] ` EGϕ→ CGϕ
– [Ax4] ` ¬CG⊥
– [Ax5] ` ¬CG>
– [Ax6] ` ¬C∅ϕ
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– [Ax7] ` EG1ϕ ∧ EG2ψ → CG1∪G2(ϕ ∧ ψ)
– [ERE] if ` ϕ↔ ψ then ` EGϕ↔ EGψ
– [ERC] if ` ϕ↔ ψ then ` CGϕ↔ CGψ
For any finite set of agents N , we can obtain a logic of coalitional agency
and ability that is represented by the set of theorems determined by the previ-
ous Hilbert system.9 Let us note this logic COALN .10 We will sometimes just
note it COAL.
Theorem 2 For a set of agents N , the logic COALN is sound and complete
with respect to the class of models of coalitional agency and ability.
Proof Soundness is readily checked. For completeness we start by defining a
canonical model. The canonical model M c = (Sc, N c, EEc, ECc, vc) is defined
as follows:
– Sc is the set of maximally COALN -consistent sets;
– N c = N ;
– For every Σ ∈ Sc: EEcΣ(G) = {|ϕ|M
c | EGϕ ∈ Σ};
– For every Σ ∈ Sc: ECcΣ(G) = {|ϕ|M
c | CGϕ ∈ Σ};
– Σ ∈ vc(p) iff p ∈ Σ.
where |ϕ|Mc = {Σ ∈ Sc | ϕ ∈ Σ}.
The Truth Lemma states that for every ϕ and Σ ∈ Sc we have M c, Σ |=
ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Σ. Equivalently ||ϕ||Mc = |ϕ|Mc . It can be proved by standard
induction. In particular, M c, Σ |= EGψ iff ||ψ||Mc ∈ EEcΣ(G) iff |ψ|M
c ∈
EEcΣ(G) (by induction hypothesis) iff EGψ ∈ Σ. The similar argument works
for the induction case of CGψ. Atomic formulas and formulas whose main
operator is a classical logical connective are trivial cases.
Let us show that EEc and ECc are well-defined. Suppose |ϕ|Mc = |ψ|Mc .
Then ` ϕ↔ ψ and by rule ERE we have for every G ⊆ N that ` EGϕ↔ EGψ.
Similarly by rule ERC we have for every G ⊆ N that ` CGϕ ↔ CGψ. This
means for all Σ ∈ Sc, that EGϕ ∈ Σ iff EGψ ∈ Σ, and that CGϕ ∈ Σ iff
CGψ ∈ Σ.
We need to prove that M c is indeed a model of coalitional agency and
ability. This is a simple task. We present the argument for Constraint 6 and
Constraint 7.
Constraint 6: Let Σ ∈ Sc. From axiom Ax6 we know that ¬C∅ϕ ∈ Σ for all
ϕ. So there is no ϕ such |ϕ|Mc ∈ ECcΣ(∅). Hence, by definition, ECcΣ(∅) = ∅.
Constraint 7: For some Σ ∈ Sc, G1 and G2, let X1 ∈ EEΣ(G1) and
X2 ∈ EEΣ(G2). So there is a formula ϕ1 such that EG1ϕ ∈ Σ and a formula
9 Observe that, as pointed out in Section 2.5 for Constraint 5 and Constraint 7, axiom Ax3
is redundant in presence of axiom Ax7. Given its importance in ELGN , we conserve it in
this axiomatization.
10 Contrarily to BIATN and ELGN , we need N to be finite. Our language refers to coalitions
of agents that are subsets of N , and the set of subsets of an enumerable infinite set is not
enumerable. Hence, a logic COALN with a possibly infinite enumerable set N of agents would
not be finitely axiomatizable.
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ϕ2 such that EG2ϕ ∈ Σ, and X1 = |ϕ1|M
c
and X2 = |ϕ2|Mc . By axiom Ax7
we obtain CG1∪G2(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∈ Σ. Hence |ϕ1|M
c ∩ |ϕ2|Mc ∈ ECcΣ(G1 ∪ G2).
We conclude that (X1 ∩X2) ∈ ECΣ(G1 ∪G2), which proves that M c satisfies
Constraint 7.
Hence, M c is a model of coalitional agency and ability. Moreover, by def-
inition, for every consistent formula ϕ there is a state in Sc that contains ϕ.
By the Truth Lemma, we conclude that for every consistent formula there is
model of coalitional agency and ability that satisfies it.
4 Algorithms for reasoning about agency and ability
In this section, we are going to devise algorithms to reason about agency and
ability, and analyze their computational complexity. More precisely for a logic
L ∈ {BIAT,ELG,COAL} we want to solve and evaluate the complexity of the
L-sat decision problem.
Definition 2 The L-sat decision problem is defined as follows:
input: a formula ϕ in the language of L;
output: false if ¬ϕ is a theorem of L; true otherwise.
Our proof of correctness of the algorithms and of their computational com-
plexity is going to be semantic. Hence, we are going to use the semantics de-
fined in Section 2 and our determination results of Section 3. Figuring out
whether a formula ¬ϕ is not a theorem (ϕ is consistent) will translate into
finding that a model in the class determining L satisfies ϕ.
As in [51], we provide a variant of “tree-less” tableaux (Section 4.1), that
can also be seen as SAT-based procedures ([43]). This will provide a decision
procedure to the problem of determining whether a formula is satisfiable. The
analysis of the algorithm will give us an upper-bound for the complexity of
the decision problem.
Remark 1 SAT-based procedures have significant appeal. Most of the comput-
ing work to determine the satisfiability of a modal formula is delegated to a
classical SAT solver for propositional logic. Any SAT solver can be plugged
in. In general, one can use any good off-the-shelf SAT solver. However, some
SAT solvers are optimized to be faster on some restricted instances of propo-
sitional formulas. It is then possible to tweak the SAT-based procedure by
heuristically selecting a SAT solver that is specialized for the kind of instance
at hand11, paving the way for efficient automated reasoning within the logics
of bringing-it-about.
We present the complete analysis for the case of the logic BIAT in Sec-
tion 4.1. In Section 4.2 we simply extend the algorithm for BIAT-sat to ELG-sat
and to COAL-sat.
11 See for instance the results of the last SAT competition
http://www.satcompetition.org/.
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4.1 Algorithm for BIAT-sat
In this section we prove that the problem of satisfiability checking within the
logic of BIAT is in PSPACE. Our proof is adapted from [51].
If ϕ is a formula, then sub¬(ϕ) is the set of all subformulas of ϕ and their
negations (we identify the formula ¬¬ψ with ψ). A semi-valuation for ϕ is a
function pi : sub¬(ϕ) −→ {0, 1} that satisfies the following conditions:
– pi(ψ) = 1 iff pi(¬ψ) = 0;
– pi(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = 1 iff pi(ψ1) = 1 and pi(ψ2) = 1;
– pi(ϕ) = 1.
The following theorem is at the center of the analysis. We relegated the
proof to the Annex; It is rather involved but the techniques are not novel.
Theorem 3 ϕ is BIAT-sat iff there is a semi-valuation pi for ϕ such that:
1. if Eaϕ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaϕ) = 1, then pi(ϕ) = 1;
2. if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1 then ¬ψ is BIAT-sat;
3. if Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk, Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all j, and










Now that we have characterized the satisfiability of formulas in terms of
the satisfiability of its sub-formulas, devising an algorithm for the decision
problem BIAT-sat is just straightforward. It justifies the following result about
the upper-bound on the complexity of satisfiability within BIAT.
Corollary 1 Checking whether a formula ϕ is BIAT-sat can be done using
space polynomial in the size of ϕ.
Proof Theorem 1 establishes that a formula ¬ϕ is not a theorem iff ϕ is satis-
fiable. To determine the satisfiability of a formula ϕ, consider the algorithm in
Figure 1. The correctness of the algorithm wrt. the decision problem BIAT-sat
is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.
Every recursive call is done on formulas with a strictly decreasing modal
depth. It means that the algorithm terminates. It also means that this is an al-
ternating polynomial-time algorithm. It implies that there exists an equivalent
deterministic polynomial space algorithm (ATIME = PSPACE).
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1. non-deterministically guess a semi-valuation pi for ϕ;
2. if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1 then check that pi(ψ) = 1;
3. if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1, recursively check that ¬ψ is BIAT-sat;
4. if Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk, Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all j, and pi(Eaψ) = 0,
then non-deterministically and recursively check that either:
–
∧
j(ψj) ∧ ¬ψ is BIAT-sat;
– (¬ψ1) ∧ ψ is BIAT-sat;
– . . .
– (¬ψk) ∧ ψ is BIAT-sat.
Fig. 1 Algorithm for solving BIAT-sat.
1. non-deterministically guess a semi-valuation pi for ϕ;
2. if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1, then check that pi(ψ) = 1;
3. if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1, recursively check that ¬ψ is ELG-sat;
4. if Caψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Caψ) = 1, recursively check that both:
– ¬ψ is ELG-sat;
– ψ is ELG-sat;
5. if Eaψ1, Caψ2 ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(Eaψ1) = 1 and pi(Caψ2) = 0 then recursively check
that (ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2) ∨ (¬ψ1 ∧ ψ2) is ELG-sat;
6. if Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk, Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all j, and pi(Eaψ) = 0,
then non-deterministically and recursively check that either:
–
∧
j(ψj) ∧ ¬ψ is ELG-sat
– (¬ψ1) ∧ ψ is ELG-sat;
– . . .
– (¬ψk) ∧ ψ is ELG-sat.
Fig. 2 Algorithm for solving ELG-sat.
4.2 Algorithms for ELG-sat and COAL-sat
The algorithm in Figure 2 is to decide whether a formula ϕ is satisfiable
(ELG-sat). The algorithm in Figure 3 is to decide whether a formula ϕ is
satisfiable (COAL-sat).
The same analysis as the one for BIAT can be done for ELG and COAL. It
can be proved that the algorithms are correct and that they allow us to reason
about the satisfiability of BIAT and of COAL in polynomial space.
5 Refining agency: delegations
So far, we believe that the principles of agency that we proposed are adequate
in every situation of coalitional agency. The logic COAL is what we consider
the minimal logic of coalitional goal-directed agency and evidence-based abil-
ity. That is, the logic that minimally extends Elgesem’s logic to the case of
coalitional agency. In this section, we introduce more principles of social in-
teraction. Ever since Chellas ([12]), the notion of delegation (or influence) has
been a major domain for applying the logics of bringing-it-about. (See also,
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1. non-deterministically guess a semi-valuation pi for ϕ;
2. if E∅ψ ∈ sub¬(ψ), then check that pi(E∅ψ) = 0;
3. if C∅ψ ∈ sub¬(ψ), then check that pi(C∅ψ) = 0;
4. if EGψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(EGψ) = 1, then check that pi(ψ) = 1;
5. if EGψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(EGψ) = 1, recursively check that ¬ψ is COAL-sat;
6. if CGψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(CGψ) = 1, recursively check that both:
– ¬ψ is COAL-sat;
– ψ is COAL-sat;
7. if either:
– EGψ1, . . . , EGψk, EGψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(EGψj) = 1 for all j, and pi(EGψ) = 0;
– EG1ψ1, . . . , EGkψk, CGψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(EGjψj) = 1 for all j, pi(CGψ) = 0,
and G = G1 ∪ . . . ∪Gk;
then non-deterministically and recursively check that either:
–
∧
j(ψj) ∧ ¬ψ is COAL-sat
– (¬ψ1) ∧ ψ is COAL-sat;
– . . .
– (¬ψk) ∧ ψ is COAL-sat.
Fig. 3 Algorithm for solving COAL-sat.
e.g., [16,34].) We then choose to investigate the mechanisms of delegation be-
tween agents and coalitions.
In Section 5.1, we study Chellas’s constraint forcing the full responsibility
of a delegating entity for the result brought about by the delegatee under
his influence. Because it is not inherently pertaining to coalitional agency,
we analyze it alongside a common assumption of logics of agency, namely
strict-joint agency. In Section 5.2 we propose a new principle forcing that the
responsibility of a delegator is shared with the delegatee.
The various principles that we offer in this section are not meant to be
integrated in COAL. We do not acknowledge them as general principles of
coalitional agency. Instead, we use the logical machinery to analyze their con-
sequences, and let a modeler judge whether they should be adopted with an
application at hand.
5.1 Two common principles
5.1.1 Strict-joint agency
It seems right in some situations that if G1 acting as a coalition is bringing
about a goal X, then all the members of G1 are actually contributing in
some way to X. (Recall Lindahl’s argument against coalition monotonicity
in Section 2.4.) They might be necessary for the performance of a bodily
movement, or they might be necessary for the group attitude that is put into
the goal X.12 We will use the term team to capture this. The members of the
team G1, each with a group attitude towards the coalition G1 with regard to
X, when G2 ⊂ G1 the group G2 cannot be agentive for X in the same way. At
12 We understand group attitude only loosely in the sense of [49].
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least the group G2 is not bringing about the goal X as a team. This is what
is captured by the following constraint:
when G2 ⊂ G1, if X ∈ EEw(G1) then X 6∈ EEw(G2). (8)
Note that the contrapositive of the constraint is equivalent to: when G1 ⊂ G2,
if X ∈ EEw(G1) then X 6∈ EEw(G2). This corresponds to the notion of strict
joint agency in the theory of seeing-to-it-that ([4,10]).
In Section 2.4, we discussed Kanger & Kanger’s principle of joint parties, or
coalition monotonicity, stating that whenever a group G brings about a goal X,
then every group constituted of at least G also brings about X. We rejected it
as a general principle. Strict joint agency and coalition monotonicity are clearly
two incompatible ways of looking at agency. Strict joint agency makes the most
sense when one considers that coalitions have to form.13 Individual agents have
incentives to participate in a coalition and a coalition has incentives to accept
a new member and form a larger coalition. A free-rider is usually not welcome.
From an external point of view, that is from the perspective of a system
engineer, this is a formal device that allows to optimize the use of the resources
(the agents) of the system. If one needs a goal X to be achieved and the group
G is able to bring it about, it would be a waste to involve a larger group
containing all the members of G. Therefore, the agency of a goal should be
attributed to the only group that is sufficient to bring about the goal and
that contains the agents that are necessary for the goal to be brought about.
Nevertheless, bear in mind that this does not rule out the existence of two or
more distinct groups that bring about the same goal; even groups that share
some members.
5.1.2 Responsibility of the delegator
Chellas ([12]) in his formalism of imperative sentences does look at principles
of interaction between agents. He argues that like in the common law maxim
“quid facit per alium facit per se”, we should have that when agent a makes
another agent bring about something, agent a is himself bringing about that
something. Lifted up to groups of agents, that would translate in our models
as:
if {v | X ∈ EEv(G2)} ∈ EEw(G1) then X ∈ EEw(G1). (9)
With this constraint, we accept a principle that the goal plus the means entails
the goal: if the goal of a coalition G1 is that another coalition brings about
X, then we acknowledge that G1 has the goal that X. Hence, coalitions are
responsible for what they bring about, even if they do so through another
acting entity.
Elgesem promptly rejected this constraint, explaining that “a person is nor-
mally not considered the agent of some consequence of his action if another
agent interferes in the causal chain.” ([15, p. 82]) . Santos et al.’s logic in [40]
13 See for instance [45].
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is equipped with two notions of agency: direct and indirect agency. They ex-
plicitly state that if agent a directly brings about that b directly brings about
that ϕ then a does not directly bring about the ϕ. They nevertheless adopt
the principle for indirect actions.
We did not commit to any direct or indirect interpretation of action in
our framework. What we assumed however in this section, is that the agentive
coalitions have some sort of identity; they are acting together as a team towards
a shared goal.
What we believe will be interesting to observe, are the possible mechanisms
of delegation, or lack thereof, between and within groups in this setting. When
“making do” is the realization of a delegation, this suggests the presence of
organized groups more on par with an institution than with a coalition. When
“making do” is the realization of a command or of a strain on the actions of
an agent or a group of agents, this means that there is some sort of authority
between the two acting entities. This suggests that delegator and delegatee
are not acting together as a team towards a shared goal. We will come back
to this issue in Section 5.1.4 after presenting the syntactic characterization of
the new models.
5.1.3 Completeness
Let us note ΛN1 the logic obtained from combining the axioms of COAL
N with
the axioms:
– [Ax8] ` EG1ϕ→ ¬EG2ϕ , when G2 ⊂ G1
– [Ax9] ` EG1EG2ϕ→ EG1ϕ
Theorem 4 The logic ΛN1 is sound and complete with respect to the models
of coalitional agency and ability satisfying Constraint 8 and Constraint 9.
Proof The proof extends the one of Theorem 2. Assume that M c is now the
canonical model built from ΛN1 -mcs. Soundness of axiom Ax9 and axiom Ax8
is straightforward. For the completeness, we need to check that M c satisfies
the additional constraints.
Constraint 8: For some Σ ∈ Sc, G1 and G2 such that G2 ⊂ G1, let X ∈
EEΣ(G1). So there is a formula ϕ such that X = |ϕ|Mc and EG1ϕ ∈ Σ. Then
by axiom Ax8 we also have ¬EG2ϕ ∈ Σ. It means that EG2ϕ 6∈ Σ and that
|ϕ|Mc = X 6∈ EEcΣ(G2). This proves that M c satisfies Constraint 8.
Constraint 9: Let {Γ | X ∈ EEΓ (G2)} ∈ EEΣ(G1) for some Σ ∈ Sc.
So there is a formula ϕ such that |ϕ|Mc = X such that {Γ | EG2ϕ ∈ Γ} ∈
EEΣ(G1). This is equivalent to |EG2ϕ|M
c ∈ EEΣ(G1). Hence EG1EG2ϕ ∈ Σ.
By axiom Ax9, we also have that EG1ϕ ∈ Σ. This means that X ∈ EEΣ(G1).
This proves that M c satisfies Constraint 9.
Remark 2 The reader more familiar with normal modal logics (roughly, logics
over Kripke models) might wonder why Ax2 does not already imply Ax9.
This is because our logics are non-monotonic. That is, the rule of monotony
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(RM) does not preserve validities; It is not the case that if ` ϕ → ψ then
` EGϕ→ EGψ. Together, Ax2 and RM would imply Ax9.
5.1.4 Impossible intra-team commands
We investigate what are the consequences of the logic ΛN1 for the relationship
between commands and coalitional agency. We claim that it captures a notion
of action of coalitions where the members of a coalition do identify with a
team for in a collectively aware manner for the bringing about of a goal.
Consider the following derivation in ΛN1 :
1. ΛN1 ` Eaϕ→ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax8)
2. ΛN1 ` EaEbϕ→ Eaϕ (instance of axiom Ax9)
3. ΛN1 ` EaEbϕ→ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (from 1. and 2. by Propositional Logic)
4. ΛN1 ` EaEbϕ→ Ebϕ (instance of axiom Ax2)
5. ΛN1 ` EaEbϕ→ Eaϕ ∧ Ebϕ (from 2. and 4. by PL)
6. ΛN1 ` Eaϕ ∧ Ebϕ→ C{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax7)
7. ΛN1 ` EaEbϕ→ ¬E{a,b}ϕ ∧ C{a,b}ϕ (from 3., 5. and 6. by PL)
So from item 3, we have that when something is achieved by a after a command
of b, the group {a, b} is not acting as a coalition. In fact, as item 2 states it, it
is in the first place a bringing about of agent a. Item 7 on the other hand shows
that a group might not be bringing about a goal, its members are nevertheless
presently showing sufficient evidence to infer that it is able to do so.
Command or delegation within a group yields different results. The follow-
ing formulas are theorems of ΛN1 :
1. ΛN1 ` E{a,b}Ebϕ→ E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax9)
2. ΛN1 ` E{a,b}Ebϕ→ Ebϕ (instance of axiom Ax2)
3. ΛN1 ` Ebϕ→ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax8)
4. ΛN1 ` E{a,b}Ebϕ→ E{a,b}ϕ ∧ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (from 1., 2., and 3. by PL)
5. ΛN1 ` ¬E{a,b}Ebϕ (from 4. by PL)
Analogously:
1. ΛN1 ` EbE{a,b}ϕ→ E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax2)
2. ΛN1 ` EbE{a,b}ϕ→ Ebϕ (instance of axiom Ax9)
3. ΛN1 ` Ebϕ→ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax8)
4. ΛN1 ` EbE{a,b}ϕ→ E{a,b}ϕ ∧ ¬E{a,b}ϕ (from 1., 2., and 3. by PL)
5. ΛN1 ` ¬EbE{a,b}ϕ (from 4. by PL)
The two previous derivations establish that a command or delegation by a
group towards a subgroup or towards a super-group is never effective. The
point is that with the constraint of strict agency a coalition G is acting together
as a team to achieve a goal of theirs. This seems in accordance with the idea
that if the coalition has to split before the goal to be obtained it does not act
as a team anyway. Therefore, when acting as a coalition, there is no sense for
a group to command something to a subgroup or a super-group. The group
only and as a whole must be solicited.
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Remark 3 Of course one might object that analogous delegations happen all
the time in societies. For instance when a company delegates a signing of a
contract to the person holding the role of CEO in the company. However,
the company is not a coalition, nor a team. It is not a group of agents, and
the person signing the contract is not part of the company but plays a role
in it, instead. Our theory of coalitional agency does not explain institutions,
roles, and institutional action. Maybe the best way to capture an institution
and a role is then to see them as fresh new individual agents. Therefore,
we would have that EIECEOϕ → EIϕ ∧ ECEOϕ where the formula EIϕ ∧
ECEOϕ is perfectly consistent. Since a role or an institution are ontologically
very peculiar kinds of agents, we would have to give a special meaning to
institutional agents at the level of the semantics. It is not our objective here.
This has been investigated in a series of papers by Pacheco and others (e.g.,
[11,35]).
5.2 Shared responsibility of the delegating entity
Although, the logic ΛN1 might be adequate in some situations, other strength-
enings of COAL are possible.
Consider the following constraint:
if {v | X ∈ EEv(G2)} ∈ EEw(G1) then X ∈ EEw(G1 ∪G2). (10)
Let us note ΛN2 the logic obtained from combining the axioms of COAL
N
with the axiom:
– [Ax10] ` EG1EG2ϕ→ EG1∪G2ϕ
We state without proof14 the following theorem:
Theorem 5 The logic ΛN2 is sound and complete with respect to the class of
models of coalitional agency and ability satisfying Constraint 10.
Constraint 10 reflects that if the group G1 makes G2 bring about that
something holds, the combined coalition G1 ∪G2 is responsible for it.
This is a principle that could not be expressed for the previous logics of
bringing-it-about, but that our new language with coalitions now allows to
formulate in a logic of bringing-it-about. Moving from individual agency to
coalitional agency might then be useful with regard to ending a long argu-
ment in the literature. Indeed, it appears as a compromise to the controversial
Constraint 9.
The following is a very simple derivation in our new system that starts
to illustrate the consequences of adopting this form of responsibility of the
delegating entity:
1. ΛN2 ` EaEbϕ→ Ebϕ (instance of axiom Ax2)
2. ΛN2 ` EaEbϕ→ E{a,b}ϕ (instance of axiom Ax10)
14 It would just consist in rewriting the case of Constraint 9 in the proof of Theorem 4.
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3. ΛN2 ` EaEbϕ→ Ebϕ ∧ E{a,b}ϕ (from 1., and 2. by PL)
Like Constraint 9, our Constraint 10 does confer some responsibility to the del-
egating entity. It might therefore satisfy some scholars like Chellas who think
that the delegating entity should bear responsibility. But the responsibility of
the delegating entity for the bringing about of a state of affairs is shared with
the delegate. Although allowed by the theory, the delegator does not have to be
individually responsible. It might then satisfy scholars like Elgesem who think
that Constraint 9 is nonsense. Still, the delegatee is individually responsible.
As a consequence, in presence of strict-joint agency (Constraint 8 or Ax8),
the consequences would be even more dramatic than in Section 5.1.4. Suppose
that G1 and G2 are different coalitions and G1 is not the empty coalition, we
have the following derivation:
1. ΛN2 ,Ax8 ` EG1EG2ϕ→ EG1∪G2ϕ (instance of axiom Ax10)
2. ΛN2 ,Ax8 ` EG1EG2ϕ→ EG2ϕ (instance of axiom Ax2)
3. ΛN2 ,Ax8 ` EG2ϕ→ ¬EG1∪G2ϕ (instance of axiom Ax8)
4. ΛN2 ,Ax8 ` ¬EG1EG2ϕ (from 1., 2., and 3. by PL)
The only admissible kind of “delegation” compatible with strict-joint agency
would then be one of a coalition towards itself. In formula, it is EGEGϕ →
EGϕ, which is already a theorem of BIAT as an instance of Ax2.
6 Refining ability: evidences and inductive reasoning
Our interpretation of Elgesem’s modality of ability as an evidence-based ability
of the group G is fine in its relationship with the modality of actual agency. As
such, however, it is arguably not strikingly useful. One can have the certainty
that the group G is able to bring about that ϕ in only two circumstances:
(i) G is actually bringing about ϕ (axiom Ax3), or (ii) some subgroups of
G1, . . . , Gk ⊆ G such that G = G1 ∪ . . . ∪ Gk are bringing about some goals
ϕ1, . . . , ϕk such that ϕ↔ ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk (axiom Ax7).
The theory does not say what this ability becomes after the actual manifes-
tation of the evidence. It might be true at some state where G is not bringing
about that ϕ, but it might as well be false. As a matter of fact, “after” has no
meaning in our theory, or in any logic of bringing-it-about in the literature.
It is in practice of limited value, e.g., if we intend to use the existence of an
ability as a suggestion of groups of services that are possibly effective for a
goal.
But an evidence-based notion of ability hints that it would benefit from
being investigated along with some form of induction. Induction is what allows
us, at least for any practical purpose, to capitalize on the fact that a popular
Internet checkout is able to bring about an online transaction. As far as we
can tell, it never failed to work when we expected it to (or it was fixed soon
after).
Our notion of evidence-based ability is calling for a similar kind of reason-
ing; one that could in fact somewhat reconcile Elgesem’s and Kenny’s views
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on ability. One can acknowledge G’s ability for the goal ϕ at any time the
coalition indeed brings it about, and then maintain this evidence-based ability
until some further evidence falsifies it. That is, as a way to encompass Kenny’s
view, to possibly drop the ability when the group fails to repeat their control
when the ‘appropriate opportunity’ arises.
Introducing inductive reasoning means that we need to transgress the tra-
dition of bringing-it-about logics which is the one of abstracting away from
time.15 Indeed, we propose to introduce a linear temporal logic. In this brief
account we can content ourselves with an ’until’ operator U. The formula ϕUψ
reads that “ϕ is true until ψ holds”.
What would constitute an evidence for falsification of an ability? We need
to introduce an elementary notion of explicit objective. For our framework,
it is certainly helpful to see an objective of an agent (or of a coalition) as
what Sommerhoff calls a Focal Condition and that is at the core of Elgesem’s
proposal. (See [16, Sect. 3] for the relationship of the Focal Condition with the
modalities EG and CG.) Let us note OGϕ to mean that “G as a group, has the
objective that ϕ”. Note that the notion of goal-directed agency justifies that:
EGϕ→ OGϕ.
We assume OG to be primitive and do not try to explain the process of nego-
tiation and preference aggregation to form a group objective.
Remark 4 Let us digress a moment from our discussion on ability. In Sec-
tion 2.5.2, we have argued that when a group G1 brings about X1 and a group
G2 brings about X2 we had no sufficient evidence that G1∪G2 brought about
X1 ∩X2. The reason was that the group G1 ∪G2 might simply not have the
goal that X1 ∩ X2. However, now that we have extended our language with
an explicit way to talk about the objective of coalitions, we could admit the
axiom
EG1ϕ ∧ EG2ψ ∧ObjG1∪G2(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ EG1∪G2(ϕ ∧ ψ).
That is, under the additional condition that G1 ∪G2 indeed has the objective
that X1 ∩X2, then we can infer that G1 ∪G2 brings about X1 ∩X2.
We say that a situation disproves that G is able to achieve the goal ϕ when
G has the objective that ϕ holds but does not bring about that ϕ. In formula,
this suggests the following principle:
CGϕ→ (CGϕ)U(OGϕ ∧ ¬EGϕ).
Hence, it is only by ‘contextual repeatability’ that one can infer that an agent
or a group has the ability to exercise a certain control. The context here, is
the adequate Focal Condition for the goal ϕ.
To illustrate this, consider again a repository of web services and a database
listing their abilities for different goals. The Focal Condition OGϕ can for
15 Nevertheless, it should be noted that bringing-it-about logics are not inherently incom-
patible with a refined ontology of time, as argued in [15].
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instance be instantiated by the existence of a certain query to the group G
to bring about ϕ. The previous formula can be used to verify that the system
satisfies the following property: a group of web services that are deemed able to
bring about a goal, is considered able to bring about the goal as long as there
is no evidence to the contrary. Notice that it does not rule out the possibility
that a group has the ability and the objective to bring about a goal but fails
to do so. It could be that the group failed to coordinate for some subjective
reason.
After a counter-evidence, the database system (on behalf of its designer) is
free (i) to drop the entry denoting the ability altogether, (ii) to flag the entry
but keep it until further confirmation of inability, (iii) to ignore the counter-
evidence and maintain the entry anyway. Options (i) and (ii) would be most in
line with Kenny’s view: who fails to repeat (possibly several times) the exercise
of control when offered the opportunity is not deemed able.
7 Discussions
Before concluding this paper we present a few considerations and ultimate
clarifications.
7.1 Logic of individuals, logic of coalitions
One possible concern with the logic COAL is that its restriction to the Ex
modality (call it COAL(E)) does not offer a distinction and dependence between
individual and group agency. In this sense, COAL(E) is not different from BIAT:
they obey the same principles, and thus, it suffices to view each non-empty
coalition in COAL(E) as a distinct individual in BIAT. The coalitional language
gets its significance (i) with the addition of the modality of ability so as to
obtain the fully fledged logic COAL; and/or (ii) with additional constraints
like Constraint 10.
7.2 Seeing To It That, and action vs. interaction
In the individual case, the respective aims of the logics of bringing-it-about
and those of seeing-to-it-that are not clearly different. In the coalitional case
however, our extension of bringing-it-about clearly considers coalitional agency
as a primitive concept, while in STIT the action of a coalition merely consists
in a profile of individual actions. In STIT the set of outcomes of the actual
choice of a coalition is completely determined as the set-theoretic intersection
of the set of outcomes of the actual choices of the members. That is, like in
non-cooperative game theory, the action of a group of agents in STIT is just
a set of individual actions.
Where STIT provides the right logical tools for a micro analysis of inter-
action, bringing-it-about seems more appropriate for the formalization of a
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macro theory of interaction. It is exemplified for instance by some authors’
use of bringing-it-about logics to study institutionalized agency ([25,11,41,
35]) while no similar work exist in STIT theories. On the other hand, STIT
has been more prominently used in multiagent systems for the study of game-
theoretical topics ([6,7,48]). It is less in tune with a macro theory of interaction
because the choice of a coalition is ontologically completely determined as the
intersection of the choices of the individuals (see [24,6,22]). The preponder-
ant roles played in STIT by the empty coalition and the grand coalition (the
coalition containing all the agents) are rather revealing. The potential mani-
festations of agency of these two special coalitions fulfill the function of two
boundaries beyond which no coalition can act.
We think that the main conceptual difference is that our coalitional version
of bringing-it-about looks at a notion of group agency that is not constructed
from individual agency. There is no undeniable superiority of one tradition of
logics of agency over the other. If we had to argue in favor of bringing-it-about,
we could find some support in the criticisms by Turner of Parsons’ theory of
action: “The basic unit of a sociological analysis is not action, but interaction;
and the presumption that one can begin with elementary conceptualizations
of action and then progressively move up to the analysis of interaction and
structure is highly questionable.” ([50, p. 3]). This, we believe can be very sig-
nificant for the formal representation and reasoning about multiagent systems.
A more systematic comparison of the logics of bringing-it-about with STIT
theories is possible by confronting the axiomatizations of Section 3 with the
axiomatizations presented in [8]. They are considerably different. The Chellas
STIT operator for instance is a normal modality. In particular, that means that
if an agent sees to it that the letter is sent, then he sees to it that the letter is
sent or burnt. In the more goal-directed bringing-it-about however, agency is
towards the goal and not towards its logical consequences. In the coalitional
case, the Chellas STIT satisfies coalition monotonicity that we have rejected
in Section 2.4 as well as superadditivity of agency that we have rejected in
Section 2.5.2.
7.3 Coalitions and Elgesem’s concepts of agency
Elgesem studied agency and ability through a net of derived concepts. We















= ¬DoesGϕ ∧ ϕ
OpportunityGϕ
def
= DoesG¬ϕ ∨ ϕ
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The first two lines are simply a redefinition of our operators into Elgesem’s
notation. The exact meaning of these concepts for coalitional agency should
not be different from the meaning in the individual case. We will not enter
in the details and we simply refer to [16]. In general, one must resist the
temptation to make up new apparently intuitive laws of coalitional agency.
An intuitive reading of a logical language should not prevail over the insights
of its semantics.
The seemingly useful formula
Does{a,b}ϕ→ Compatible{a}ϕ
(if a group G brings about that ϕ, then ϕ is compatible with the agency of
every member of G) is already a theorem of BIAT because of Ax2. In fact it
is true that DoesG1ϕ → CompatibleG2ϕ for any two arbitrary coalitions G1
and G2.
One might also consider useful the formula
Does{a,b}ϕ→ ¬Independently{a}ϕ.
It captures the fact that if a group G brings about that ϕ, then ϕ is not
independent of the agency of any of the members of G. The issue is that
the agency of the individual members a ∈ G represented by a formula like
Doesaψ captures exclusively the actions of the individual a acting alone to-
wards an individual goal. A consequence of adopting the formula above would
be Does{a,b}ϕ → Doesaϕ, which should not be a general principle according
to our interpretation of agency.
8 Conclusions and perspectives
We have lifted Elgesem’s logic of individual agency and ability to the coali-
tional setting. We showed that it offers more flexibility in identifying potential
ability of the multiagent system to bring about complex goals. We provided
a complete axiomatization and studied the computational complexity for sat-
isfiability checking of the logics of bringing-it-about. We offered alternating
polynomial-time algorithms to solve the problem of satisfiability checking in
the logics BIAT, ELG and COAL.
We then proposed several specializations of COAL. We illustrated the logic
by showing that commands within a team is impossible when we assume strict-
joint agency and full responsibility of the delegating entity, two common prin-
ciples of agency. Capitalizing on our language with coalitions, we proposed a
new principle that states the occurrence of a delegation implies a responsi-
bility of the team consisting of the delegating entity and of the delegate. We
believe this principle might reconcile an argument in the literature about the
principle of individual responsibility of the delegating entity. We sketched the
idea of integrating temporal features in the models of bringing-it-about.
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A few perspectives emerge from the present research. The first one is techni-
cal and concerns the computational complexity of the logics. We only provided
upper-bounds. Even though there are many reasons to believe that the results
are tight,16 we did not rule out the possibility that maybe our algorithms are
not optimal. Proving lower-bounds for non-normal modal logics, however, is
a very delicate problem in mathematical logic. For normal modal logics, the
standard proof relies heavily on the existence of a semantics in terms of Kripke
models ([30,20]). We do not have this luck here.
Two other perspectives concern the extensions of COAL that we have pro-
posed in Section 5.2 and in Section 6, and of which we only scratched the
surface.
A more empirical study could be done concerning the adequateness of Con-
straint 10 in some application domains. Does it correspond to some real world
situations? Does it reflect the decision in the attribution of responsibilities
in some court set of laws? Our brief logical analysis falls short of providing
answers to these questions, that are beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, a rigorous framework integrating inductive reasoning with the con-
cepts or agency and evidence-based ability could be enlightening. It would have
the potential to bridge the gap between several notions of ability, power, op-
portunity, etc, that have been studied in the literature. In general, we believe
that composing the very abstract models of bringing-it-about with simple tem-
poral models is promising. Recently, the seeing-to-it-that logics seem to have
been preferred by the community, arguably because of the temporal features
of their models. It will be interesting to investigate further what new insights
we can find for a number of topics studied in other multiagent theories: e.g.,
knowing how to play, strategically bringing about, etc.
Annex: proof of Theorem 3
Left-to-right direction
Suppose ϕ is BIAT-sat. This means that there is a model of individual agency
M = (S,N,EE, v), and a world w ∈ S, such that M,w |= ϕ. Define the
function pi : sub¬(ϕ) −→ {0, 1} as follows: for all ψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ),
pi(ψ) =
{
1 when M,w |= ψ
0 otherwise.
It is readily checked that pi is a semi-valuation. It remains to show that pi
satisfies all three conditions.
16 A rule of thumb is that over a non-restricted language (all Boolean combinations, un-
bounded modal depth, etc), if a classical modal logic admits axiom Ax1 (axiom K) but does
not admit ¬Exϕ→ Ex¬Exϕ (axiom 5), it is PSPACE-hard.
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1. if pi(Eaϕ) = 1 then M,w |= Eaϕ by definition of pi. So ||ϕ||M ∈ EEw(a).
Since M is a model of individual agency we also have that w ∈ ||ϕ||M by
Constraint 2. Hence, M,w |= ϕ, which means that pi(ϕ) = 1.
2. As previously, pi(Eaϕ) = 1 implies that ||ϕ||M ∈ EEw(a). By Constraint 1E
||ϕ||M 6= S. It means that there is a world u ∈ ||¬ϕ||M . Hence, M,u |= ¬ϕ,
which means that ¬ϕ is BIAT-sat.
3. Again, for all j, pi(Eaψj) = 1 implies that ||ψj ||M ∈ EEw(a). By Con-
straint 4 we obtain that (
⋂
j ||ψj ||M ) ∈ EEw(a). By hypothesis, pi(Eaψ) =
0. Thus, ||ψ||M 6∈ EEw(a) and clearly ||ψ||M 6=
⋂
j ||ψj ||M . It implies that
there must exist a world u such that either u ∈ ⋂j ||ψj ||M ∩ ||¬ψ||M or
u ∈ ⋃j ||¬ψj ||M ∩ ||ψ||M . It means that the formula (∧j(ψj) ∧ ¬ψ) ∨
(
∨
j(¬ψj) ∧ ψ) is indeed satisfiable: it is true in the world u.
Right-to-left direction
Suppose now that there is a semi-valuation pi such that we have (1), (2) and
(3) like in the formulation of Theorem 3. We can rewrite (3) as: if Eaψ1, . . . ,
Eaψk, Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all j, and pi(Eaψ) = 0, then
there is a witness pointed model of individual agency (Mψ1,...ψk,ψ, wψ1,...ψk,ψ)









also rewrite (2) as: if Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) and pi(Eaψ) = 1 then there is a witness
pointed model of individual agency (Mψ, wψ) such that Mψ, wψ |= ¬ψ.
Let (M1, w1) . . . , (Mn, wn) be an enumeration of all these witness pointed
models of agency M i = (Si, N,EEi, vi). This enumeration is finite because
the length of ϕ is finite and only a finite number of Eaψ are in sub
¬(ϕ). We
assume w.l.o.g. that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ when i 6= j.
To establish that ϕ is BIAT-sat, we are going to construct a model of
individual agency that satisfies it. Suppose a new fresh world w 6∈ ⋃i Si. Let
M = (S,N,EE, v) such that: S = {w} ∪⋃ni=1 Si.
Instrumental for the definition of v and EE, we first introduce an intention
assignment for formulas in sub¬(ϕ). Let V : sub¬(ϕ) −→ 2S , such that




Our model valuation v is simply defined as the projection of V on the set
P of propositional variables (we can assume w.l.o.g. that P ⊆ sub¬(ϕ)). That
is, v(p) = V (p) for p ∈ P .
We finally define EE. For every u ∈ S, we let X ∈ EEu(a) iff there are
Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with X =
⋂k
j=1 V (ψj) and{
pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k when u = w;
M i, u |= Eaψj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k when u ∈ Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This following claim will be useful later.
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Claim 1 If V (ψ) ∈ EEa(u) and Eaψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) then either u = w and
pi(Eaψ) = 1 or u ∈ Sc and M c, u |= Eaψ (1 ≤ c ≤ n).
Proof Case u = w: suppose V (ψ) ∈ EEa(w). That is there Eaψ1, . . . Eaψk ∈
sub¬(ϕ) such that V (ψ) =
⋂k
j=1 V (ψj) and pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all j.
Now suppose that Eaψ ∈ sub¬ϕ and for contradiction, that pi(Eaψ) = 0.









This means that ||ψ||Mψ1,...ψk,ψ 6= ⋂kj=1 ||ψj ||Mψ1,...ψk,ψ . Consequently, V (ψ) 6=⋂k
j=1 V (ψj)—a contradiction.
Case u ∈ Sc: suppose V (ψ) ∈ EEa(u). So there are Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk ∈
sub¬ϕ such that V (ψ) =
⋂k
j=1 V (ψj) and M
c, u |= Eaψj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k.




c ∈ EEca(u). Since V (ψ) =
⋂k
j=1 V (ψj) and because
Si ∪ Sj = ∅ when i 6= j, we also have that ||ψ||Mc = ⋂kj=1 ||ψj ||Mc . Hence,
||ψ||Mc ∈ EEca(u), which means that M c, u |= Eaψ.
We need to make sure that M is indeed a model of individual agency.
Claim 2 M is a model of individual agency.
Proof Constraint 1E: Clearly by construction and because Si 6∈ EEiu(a), we
have S 6∈ EEu(a) for u 6= w. Now, suppose for contradiction that S ∈ EEw(a).
It means that there are Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk ∈ sub¬(ϕ), with S =
⋂k
j=1 V (ψj)
and pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Hence, V (ψj) = {w | pi(ψj) = 1} ∪⋃n
i=1 ||ψj ||M
i
= S for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k. As we assumed that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ when
i 6= j, it means that ||ψj ||Mi = Si for all i. In particular, ||ψj ||Mj = Sj . But
since, pi(Eaψj) = 1, by hypothesis (2), it means that Mj , wj |= ¬ψj , that is,
wj ∈ ∅—a contradiction.
Constraint 2: Now, suppose that X ∈ EEu(a). We need to show that
u ∈ X.
By construction, there are Eaψ1, . . . , Eaψk ∈ sub¬(ϕ), such that X =⋂k
j=1 V (ψj) and{
pi(Eaψj) = 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k if u = w;
M i, u |= Eaψj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k if u ∈ Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If u ∈ Sc, we have ||ψj ||Mc ∈ EEu(a) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Since M c is
a model of individual agency, we also have u ∈ ||ψj ||Mc for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
(Constraint 2 on M c). So u ∈ ⋂kj=1 ||ψj ||Mc . Then, u ∈ ⋂kj=1⋃ni=1 ||ψj ||Mi .
Then, u ∈ ⋂kj=1{w | pi(ψj) = 1} ∪ ⋂kj=1⋃ni=1 ||ψj ||Mi which is equivalent to
u ∈ X.
If u = w, by hypothesis (1), we have pi(ψj) = 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. So indeed,
u ∈ ⋂kj=1 V (ψj).
Constraint 4: X1 ∈ EEu(a) and X2 ∈ EEu(a). We need to show that
(X1 ∩X2) ∈ EEu(a).
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We do not give the details. Again, if u ∈ Sc (1 ≤ c ≤ n), it holds in virtue
of Ma being a model of individual agency; this time we use Constraint 4 on
Ma. If u = w, the proof uses hypothesis (3).
Finally, we are going to prove that ϕ is true in M at w. To do this, we
show that for all ψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ), we have V (ψ) = ||ψ||M .
Claim 3 If ψ ∈ sub¬(ϕ) then V (ψ) = ||ψ||M .
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. This holds for ψ = p,
p ∈ P , by definition of v(p) and ||p||M . It also holds for ψ = ¬γ, and ψ = γ1∨γ2,
because V (¬γ) = S \ V (γ) and V (γ1 ∨ γ2) = V (γ1) ∪ V (γ2) respectively.
For ψ = Eaγ, we assume inductively that V (γ) = ||γ||M and show that for
every u ∈ S, u ∈ V (Eaγ) iff u ∈ ||Eaγ||M .
Suppose u ∈ V (Eaγ) then either u = w and pi(Eaγ) = 1, or u ∈ Sa and
Ma, u |= Eaγ. In both cases, by definition of EE, we have V (γ) ∈ EEa(u).
By induction hypothesis, we have ||γ||M ∈ EEa(u). Hence M,u |= Eaγ, that
is, u ∈ ||Eaγ||M .
The other way around suppose that u ∈ ||Eaγ||M , that is, M,u |= Eaγ. It
means that ||γ||M ∈ EEa(u). By induction hypothesis, V (γ) ∈ EEa(u). We
conclude using Claim 1 that u ∈ V (Eaγ).
To sum up, we have built a structure M that is a model of individual agency
(Claim 2), and ||ϕ||M = V (ϕ) (Claim 3). By definition of V and because
pi(ϕ) = 1 (pi is a semi-valuation of ϕ), we have that M,w |= ϕ. So indeed, ϕ is
BIAT-sat. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
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